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Abstract
We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer’s income in a dynamic principal-
agent model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income
and stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income
taxpayer who transits to high income can under-report his true income and evade
his taxes. With a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function and a costly
auditing technology, we show that the optimal auditing mechanism in our model
consists of cycles. Within each cycle, a low-income taxpayer is initially unaudited,
but if the duration of low-income report exceeds a threshold, then the auditing
probability becomes positive. That is, the tax authority guarantees that the tax-
payer will not be audited until the threshold duration is reached. We also find
that auditing becomes less frequent if the auditing cost is higher or if the variance
of income is lower.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on tax compliance following the approach to crime and
punishment developed in Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970). For instance, Reinganum
and Wilde (1985, 1986) examine a static model where taxpayers’ incomes are private in-
formation. Using the costly state verification framework developed by Townsend (1979),
they study optimal verification schemes when the tax and the penalty are exogenously
specified. In this paper, we characterize the optimal auditing and taxation scheme in a
dynamic stochastic costly-state-verification environment.
We develop a model where the tax authority (principal) is risk neutral and taxpay-
ers (agents) have constant absolute risk-averse preferences. Each agent knows his own
income but it is unobserved by the principal. The principal may audit an agent to verify
his income, but this is costly. The tax authority designs an optimal taxation scheme
as well as an optimal auditing scheme to maximize the present value of revenue net of
audit cost. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and receive stochastic op-
portunities each period to transit to high income. For convenience, we assume that high
income is an absorbing state. Since income is private information, the taxpayer could
conceal the fact that he has transited to high income and evade taxes. The punishment,
if the taxpayer is audited and caught cheating, is assumed to be a constant. We use
a dynamic mechanism-design approach to search for the best tax system and auditing
system within a large family of state-contingent contracts.
Our model contains persistent private information and, as demonstrated by Fer-
nandes and Phelan (2000), the principal’s problem contains two state variables: the
continuation utility for an agent who just transited to high income and the continuation
utility for a low-income agent. We follow Zhang (2009) and set up the principal’s prob-
lem in continuous time. We then formulate the Hamiltonian and apply the Pontryagin
maximum principle to study the dynamic behavior of continuation utilities.
Since high income is an absorbing state in our model, the treatment of the agent
who just transited to high income is straightforward – constant consumption forever
and, hence, constant continuation utility. Furthermore, he is never audited. However,
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the principal has to provide incentives for the low-income agent to truthfully report the
transition to high income. Since income is private information, the principal would not
fully insure the low-income agent. The distortion in the consumption path for a low-
income agent is a key object of interest. We measure this distortion as the difference
between the cost of providing the continuation utility to the low-income agent and the
cost of providing the same utility using a perfectly smooth consumption path. We show
that the distortion is determined by the ratio of the two state variables noted above.
Our main result is that it is optimal for the principal to audit the agent periodically.
The auditing mechanism in our model consists of cycles. The low-income agent could
be in one of two states: (i) not audited or (ii) randomly drawn to be audited. Within
each cycle, a low-income agent is initially in the not-audited state. He will be moved
into the random audit state if the duration of his low-income report exceeds a threshold
N , where N is pinned down by the primitives of the model. If he is randomly drawn
to be audited, then he will be moved to the not-audited state after being audited, and
a new cycle begins. While auditing is stochastic, the threshold duration N is not. Put
differently, within each cycle the principal guarantees that the agent will not be audited
until the duration N is reached. The intuition for the periodicity is that the benefit of
auditing is increasing with the number of non-audited periods, while the cost of auditing
is constant. Auditing occurs when the benefit exceeds the cost.
In our model, there are two instruments for providing incentives. One instrument
is dynamic taxation that distorts the consumption path and makes future payoffs con-
tingent on past history of reported incomes. This is the standard instrument used in
dynamic mechanism-design. For instance, Green (1987) uses this instrument to provide
incentives for truthful reporting of income by designing taxes and subsidies that are
history-dependent. The second instrument is auditing; the principal has to pay a cost
to use the instrument. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service uses the second instrument to
provide incentives for taxpayers to pay their true share of taxes – those who are caught
cheating will be penalized. The principal in our model has access not only to the past
history of reported incomes but also to the history of auditing outcomes and, hence, can
provide better incentives by using both instruments.
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To understand the interaction between the two instruments, we study two versions
of the model: one with only the dynamic taxation instrument and the other with both
taxation and audit instruments. The model with only the dynamic taxation instrument
implies that the consumption path is increasingly distorted with the duration of low-
income report. That is, the ratio of continuation utilities approaches one with the
duration of low-income report and the principal has to deliver a consumption stream
to the low-income agent that yields almost the same utility as that to the high-income
agent. In order to ensure that the high-income agent does not have the incentive to
deviate, this consumption stream is such that the static gain to the high-income agent
from deviation is small whereas the future losses are large. We show that this path is
highly distorted since it implies a steeply declining consumption profile. We also show
that the ratio of continuation utilities is close to one in the long run, meaning that
the distortion in the consumption path converges to infinity. In contrast, if the income
process was i.i.d., as in Green (1987), the distortion is constant.
When the auditing instrument is also available, we show that the principal uses
this instrument to alleviate the distortion in the consumption path implied by the first
instrument. Auditing reduces the distortion, because when the agent’s true income is
observed during the audit, the principal rewards the truth-teller relative to the cheater.
In particular, the principal removes the distortion (accumulated up to the auditing date)
in consumption and increases the continuation utility for the truth-teller. This is not
possible when there is no technology to ever verify who is the truth-teller and who is
the cheater. We show that the optimal mechanism implies a discrete upward jump in
the continuation utility for the truth-teller after the audit. We also show that no matter
how high the cost of auditing is, there always exists a threshold N at which the auditing
probability becomes positive.
If the agent’s absolute risk aversion is not constant, then he is audited minimally
when risk aversion is either extremely high or extremely low. When risk aversion is
extremely low, the distortion in consumption incurs little welfare loss, thus there is no
need to use the costly auditing instrument to reduce the distortion in consumption.
When risk aversion is large, then a small distortion in consumption will generate large
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incentive effects, hence there is again no need to use the auditing instrument. The model
also implies that, as the variance in income increases, auditing occurs more frequently.
In related literature on dynamic costly-state-verification, Wang (2005) studies deter-
ministic verification with i.i.d. hidden incomes. He finds that there is a critical level of
verification cost, below which there is verification and above which there is no verifica-
tion. That is, if it is optimal to verify in one period then it is optimal to verify in every
period. Thus, the verification in Wang (2005) is a static decision: it only depends on
the cost of verification and is independent of the continuation utility that summarizes
the past history. In our model, the auditing decision is dynamic and depends on past
history via the duration of low-income reports. Popov (2007) studies stochastic verifica-
tion with i.i.d. hidden incomes. He specifies an exogenous lower bound for the agent’s
continuation utility and every cheater is moved to the lower bound if caught during the
audit. He obtains a nonstatic verification probability: agents with high continuation
utility are verified less frequently. In his model, these agents are induced to tell the
truth because the lower bound implies a harsher punishment for them if they are caught
lying. In our model, punishment is the same across all levels of continuation utilities and
there is no lower bound on continuation utility. Our periodic auditing result comes from
the persistent income shock and the resulting distorted consumption path. Monnet and
Quintin (2005) study stochastic verification with linear utility and i.i.d. hidden incomes.
They find that the continuation utility is increasing and verification will eventually not
be used. We study the risk-averse case, thus consumption distortion plays a central role
in our model.
Although we focus on tax compliance in the paper, the issue of fraud and optimal
auditing is applicable to other areas in economics. For instance, a venture capitalist
provides start-up funds to an entrepreneur to invent a new product. In the experimen-
tal stage, the entrepreneur receives outside funding but after the product is invented,
he might have to share the profits with the venture capitalist. If the outcome of the
experiment is private information, then the entrepreneur can delay the report of being
successful, keep the profit by selling the product privately and continue to receive fund-
ing from the venture capitalist. In the problem of infant industry protection, domestic
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firms are subsidized for a certain period to help them increase their productivity and
compete with foreign firms. If productivity is private information, the firms have strong
incentives to cheat because they can earn monopoly rents and receive subsidies simulta-
neously. In the context of unemployment insurance, an unemployed worker might find
a job at a random rate. The exact date when he finds the job might not be observable.
By delaying the report of employment, the worker can receive both wage income and
unemployment benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model
without auditing, and shows that the distortion in consumption increases with the du-
ration of the low-income report. In Section 3, we introduce the auditing technology and
show that it is optimal to audit the low-income agent periodically. Then we study the
dependence of auditing frequency on the primitives of the model. Section 4 concludes.
We provide the proofs of all the results in an appendix.
2 Model: No Auditing Technology
In this section we study a hidden income model in which the principal does not
have access to an auditing technology. The characterization of the optimal contract in
this section will help us examine the optimal auditing in Section 3 when an auditing
technology is available.
The tax authority is a risk-neutral principal with a discount rate r > 0. The taxpayer
is a risk-averse agent, whose preferences are given by
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(ct)dt
]
,
where ct is consumption at time t, u(c) = − exp(−ρc) is a constant absolute risk-aversion
(CARA) utility function with risk aversion ρ, r is the discount rate (same as that of the
principal) and E is the expectations operator. Let c : (−∞, 0) → R denote the inverse
of the utility function:
(1) c(u) =
− log(−u)
ρ
.
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To simplify our presentation, we first describe a discrete-time analogue of the model,
and then consider the continuous-time model as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time
models when the period length shrinks to zero. In a discrete-time model, period n
(n = 0, 1, 2, ...) represents the time interval [ndt, (n+1)dt) where dt > 0 is the length of
one period.
Agents have either high income, wH , or low income, wL, where wL < wH . The
high-income state is permanent.1 All agents start with low income. In each period, a
low-income agent transits to wH with probability π.dt, where π > 0 is the Poisson arrival
rate of wH .
True income is not observable by the principal, so a high-income agent can underre-
port his income and pose as a low-income agent. We assume that the principal always
asks the agent to show his reported income, so the low-income agent can never pretend
to have wH . Hence, there are no incentive constraints when the agent reports wH .
The timing is as follows. In the initial period, the agent receives an income, either
wH or wL. He chooses to report either wH or wL to the principal. The principal assigns
current and future consumptions based on the report. In subsequent periods, if an
agent had reported wH in the past, he is in an absorbing state and no further reports
are necessary. If an agent had reported wL in every period in the past, then he receives
an income, either wH or wL. The sequence of events then is the same as in the initial
period.
The principal commits to delivering two sequences of consumptions,
{ (
cH(n), cL(n)
)
;n =
0, 1, 2, ...
}
. We will denote this pre-commitment contract as σ. If an agent transits to wH
for the first time in period j, efficiency requires that the agent’s consumption remains
constant afterwards. This is because the principal and the agent have the same discount
rate and wH is an absorbing state. We denote this constant level of consumption by
cH(j). The flow utility in each period from this level of consumption then is ru
(
cH(j)
)
.
Let H(j) ≡ u(cH(j)) denote the discounted sum of utilities to an agent who transits to
wH for the first time in period j. Note that H(j) is also the continuation utility to an
1That high income is an absorbing state allows us to focus on one spell of transiting to high
income. If high income is not permanent, then the agent might experience multiple spells;
nevertheless, the analysis within each spell would be similar to what we carry out here.
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agent who transited to wH before j but reports wH for the first time in period j, since
true income is not observable.
For a low-income agent, the consumption sequence
{
cL(n)
}
has to provide incentives
to truthfully report the transition to the high income state. The continuation utility
L(n) to an agent who has low income until n− 1 is
L(n) =
∞∑
i=n
e−(i−n)rdt(1− πdt)i−n
(
πdtH(i) + (1− πdt) (rdt)u(cL(i))
)
.
The temporary incentive compatibility constraint requires that an agent who transited
to high income in the current period does not have the incentive to delay the report of
the transition to the next period, i.e., report wL in the current period and wH in future
periods:
H(n) ≥ (rdt)u(cL(n) + wH − wL) + (1− rdt)H(n+ 1), n = 0, 1, 2, ...
The above constraint can be simplified as follows. CARA utility implies that u(cL(n) +
wH − wL) = u(c
L(n))|u(wH − wL)|. Define
b ≡ |u(wH − wL)| ∈ (0, 1),
so the temporary incentive compatibility constraint can be written as
(2) H(n) ≥ (rdt)bu(cL(n)) + (1− rdt)H(n+ 1).
The expected cost for the principal is
C(σ) =
∞∑
n=0
e−nrdt(1− πdt)n
(
πdtcH(n) + (1− πdt)(rdt)cL(n)
)
.
There should, in fact, be an additional term in C(σ): the discounted income obtained
by the principal, wL+
π(wH−wL)
(r+π)
. However, unlike the unemployment insurance literature
that endogenizes search efforts and job-finding probabilities, the discounted income in
our model is a constant, so it does not affect the optimal σ.
The principal’s problem is to find an incentive compatible (I.C.) σ that delivers a
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level of initial utility L0 to a low-income agent and minimizes C(σ), i.e.,
min
σ
C(σ)
s.t. L0 =
∞∑
n=0
e−nrdt(1− πdt)n
(
πdtH(n) + (1− πdt) (rdt)u(cL(n))
)
,
and (2) for n = 0, 1, 2, ...
Next we will obtain a continuous-time representation of the above problem. First,
denote u(cL(t)) as uL(t) and write the promise-keeping constraints and incentive con-
straints recursively as,
L(t) = πdtH(t) + (1− πdt)
[
(rdt)uL(t) + (1− rdt)L(t+ dt)
]
,
H(t) ≥ (rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)H(t+ dt).
Second, transform these into differential equations and inequalities. For example, the
inequality above can be rewritten as H(t+dt)−H(t)
dt
≤ rH(t+ dt) − rbuL(t). Taking limit
dt→ 0 yields the differential inequality below.
dL(t)
dt
= (r + π)L(t)− πH(t)− ruL(t),
dH(t)
dt
≤ rH(t)− rbuL(t).
Introducing a slack variable µ(t) ≥ 0 in the above differential inequality and rewriting
the cost in continuous time, we get
min
σ
C(σ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rc(uL(t))
)
dt(3)
s.t.
dL(t)
dt
= (r + π)L(t)− πH(t)− ruL(t),(4)
dH(t)
dt
= rH(t)− rbuL(t)− µ(t).(5)
Following Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Zhang (2009), we write the principal’s
problem as a dynamic programming problem, with L and H as the state variables and
uL and µ as the control variables. With a slight abuse of notation, denote the principal’s
cost function as C(L,H).
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Remark 1 We include H in the state variable for incentive reasons. The principal
chooses H(0) freely to minimize cost (i.e., ∂C
∂H
= 0). In any continuation contract,
however, H is no longer a free variable, because H acts as a threat utility. Raising H(t)
might induce an agent who transited to wH in earlier periods to postpone the high-income
report until t.
Remark 2 The domain of the cost function C(L,H) in the dynamic programming prob-
lem is {(L,H) : L < H < 0}. If L is not strictly below H, then a high-income agent
would pose as a low-income agent and consume more than a low-income agent.
In the rest of this section, we study the solution to problem (3) in three steps. In
subsection 2.1, we prove a homogeneity property of the cost function C(L,H) and use it
to introduce a measure of consumption distortion. In subsection 2.2, we formulate the
Hamiltonian of (3) and derive a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE) that
fully characterizes the optimal contract. In subsection 2.3, we obtain properties of the
cost function and the dynamics of the state variables. In particular, we show that the
distortion is increasing with the duration of low-income report. We summarize these
results in Lemma 3 and will use them in Section 3.
2.1 A Measure of Distortion
Recall that the agent’s utility function belongs to the CARA class. A property of
the utility function is that
− exp
(
−ρ
(
−
log(α)
ρ
+ c
))
= −α exp(−ρc), for all α > 0.
Suppose that a contract σ =
{(
cL(t), cH(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
delivers the continuation utility pair
(L,H). Then, a contract
σα =
{(
−
log(α)
ρ
+ cL(t),−
log(α)
ρ
+ cH(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
delivers the pair (αL, αH). The reverse is also true. Further, σ is I.C. if and only if
σα is I.C. Therefore,
{(
cL∗(t), cH∗(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal contract to deliver (L,H)
if and only if
{(
− log(α)
ρ
+ cL∗(t),− log(α)
ρ
+ cH∗(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal contract to
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deliver (αL, αH). The next lemma states this homogeneity property and will be used
to establish other properties of the cost function.2
Lemma 1 The cost function C has the following properties:
(i) (Homogeneity) For any α > 0,
C(αL, αH) = C(L,H) +
− log(α)
ρ
,(6)
CLL+ CHH = −
1
ρ
;(7)
(ii) (Monotonicity) CL > 0, CH ≤ 0.
Recall that c is the inverse of the utility function, so equation (6) is the same as
C(αL, αH) = C(L,H) + c(−α).
We can thus decompose the cost C(L,H) as
C(L,H) = C
(
−1,−
H
L
)
+ c(L).
Under full information, the principal will deliver L to the low-income agent via a stream
of constant consumption and the cost of delivering L is c(L). The distortion of con-
sumption to the low-income agent in our contract can be measured by the difference
between the cost C(L,H) and the full information cost c(L):
(8) C(L,H)− c(L) = C
(
−1,−
H
L
)
.
It is helpful to compare the distortion in our model to that in Green (1987). With
i.i.d. incomes, private information and CARA utility, Green (1987) shows that the cost
function implied by the optimal contract differs from the full information cost function
only by a constant. Thus, the distortion in any continuation contract in the i.i.d. case
is constant. In particular, the distortion is independent of the history, or the level of
evolving continuation utilities. With persistent shocks, the distortion is independent of
the level of the continuation utility L, but depends on the ratio H
L
, as noted in equation
(8). Part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that the higher the ratio is, the higher the distortion
will be.
2We use CL, CH , CLL, CLH , and CHH to denote partial derivatives
∂C
∂L ,
∂C
∂H ,
∂2C
∂L2
, ∂
2C
∂L∂H , and
∂2C
∂H2
, respectively.
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2.2 The Hamiltonian
The problem faced by the principal is to choose a time path (uL(t), µ(t)) to mini-
mize the cost in (3). Given the path (uL(t), µ(t)) and an initial state (L(0), H(0)), the
promise-keeping and incentive constraints (4) and (5) imply a time path (L(t), H(t))
for continuation utilities. One way to think about this problem is to think of choosing
(uL(t), µ(t)) at each date, given the values of (L(t), H(t)) that have been attained by
that date. The principal faces a tradeoff between the current-period cost, c(uL(t)), and
the cost of delivering continuation utility, and hence needs to set “prices”, Φ and −λ,
on increments to the continuation utilities L and H :
Φ = CL,−λ = CH ≤ 0.
A central construct in the study of optimal allocation is the current value Hamiltonian
H defined by
H (L,H,Φ, λ, uL, µ) = (πc(H)+ rc(uL))+Φ((r+π)L− ruL−πH)−λ(rH− rbuL−µ),
which is just the sum of current-period cost and the rate of increase in continuation
utilities (see (4) and (5)), the latter valued at Φ(t) and −λ(t). An optimal allocation
must minimize H at each date t.
The first-order condition for minimizing H with respect to uL is
(9) c′(uL) = Φ− bλ.
The left hand is the marginal cost of today’s utility, while the right hand is the marginal
cost of starting with higher continuation utility tomorrow, offset by the benefit of a
slacker incentive constraint. The utility uL must be chosen to equalize the costs at each
date. Note that equation (9) implies λ ∈ [0,Φ/b] along the optimal path.
The prices Φ(t) and −λ(t) must satisfy
dΦ(t)
dt
= (r + π)Φ(t)−
∂H (L(t), H(t),Φ(t), λ(t), uL(t), µ(t))
∂L
= 0,(10)
dλ(t)
dt
= (r + π)λ(t) +
∂H (L(t), H(t),Φ(t), λ(t), uL(t), µ(t))
∂H
(11)
= π(λ(t) + c′(H(t))− Φ(t)),
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at each date t if (uL(t), µ(t)) is an optimal path. Equation (10) implies that Φ is a con-
stant. Furthermore, since the principal chooses the optimalH(0) to satisfy CH(L(0), H(0))=0,
we can pin down Φ by the level of initial utility L0 and equation (7) in Lemma 1. Hence,
(12) Φ =
−1
ρL0
.
Using the above differential equations, the following lemma shows that the incentive
constraints are always binding.
Lemma 2 λ(0) = 0 and λ(t) > 0, for all t > 0; µ(t) = 0 for all t.
To summarize, the dynamics are given by
dλ
dt
= π(λ+ c′(H)− Φ),
dL
dt
= (r + π)L− πH − ruL,
dH
dt
= rH − rbuL.
From equation (1), the inverse of the utility function implies that c′(H) = − 1
ρH
. From
(1) and (9), we can determine uL = − 1
ρ(Φ−bλ)
.
Substituting for uL and c′(H), the dynamics are described by an ODE system:
dλ
dt
= π
(
λ−
1
ρH
− Φ
)
,(13)
dL
dt
= (r + π)L− πH +
r
ρ (Φ− bλ)
,(14)
dH
dt
= rH +
rb
ρ (Φ− bλ)
.(15)
2.3 The Analysis of the ODE System
In the ODE system, equations (14) and (15) are nonlinear in λ, while (13) is nonlinear
in H. To facilitate the analysis of the ODE system, in this subsection, we will first reduce
the above system to a system with only two variables, λ andH . Second, we will eliminate
the nonlinearity in one of the differential equations in the reduced system by a simple
transformation of variables. Finally, we will obtain some properties of the cost function
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and dynamics of the state variable in the reduced and transformed ODE system. These
properties will be used in Section 3.
To reduce the ODE system, we will show that equation (14) is redundant if equations
(13), (15), and Lemma 1 hold. Rewrite equation (7) in Lemma 1 as ΦL − λH = −1
ρ
and differentiate both sides with respect to time:
Φ
dL
dt
−
dλ
dt
H − λ
dH
dt
= 0.
After the substitution of (13) and (15), the above equation becomes
Φ
dL
dt
= π
(
λ−
1
ρH
− Φ
)
H + λ
(
rH +
rb
ρ (Φ− bλ)
)
= (r + π)λH −
π
ρ
+
rbλ
ρ (Φ− bλ)
− πΦH
= (r + π)
(
λH −
1
ρ
)
+
rΦ
ρ (Φ− bλ)
− πΦH
= (r + π)ΦL− πΦH +
rΦ
ρ (Φ− bλ)
,
which is equation (14) multiplied by a positive constant Φ.
The reduced ODE system now consists of only equations (13) and (15). Since we
will show later that limt→∞H(t) = −∞, it is convenient to eliminate the nonlinearity
in H in the reduced system. To this end, we introduce a new variable
y ≡ c′(H) = −
1
ρH
to replace H . We then have
dy
dt
=
1
ρH2
dH
dt
=
ry2
Φ/b− λ
− ry.
Thus, the ODE system in the previous section can now be written as
dλ
dt
= π(λ+ y − Φ),(16)
dy
dt
=
ry2
Φ/b− λ
− ry,(17)
where λ ≥ 0 and y > 0.
In what follows, we will characterize the solution to (16) and (17). It is easy to see
that dλ
dt
> 0 if and only if y > Φ−λ, and dy
dt
> 0 if and only if y > Φ
b
−λ. Figure 1 is the
14
λy
line y = Φ− λ
line y = Φ/b − λ
(Φ, 0)(0, 0)
Figure 1: Phase diagram for the system in equations (16) and (17).
L
H
45-degree line
(0, 0)
Figure 2: Time path of (L(t), H(t)).
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phase diagram for the system in equations (16) and (17). We summarize the dynamics
of the ODE system in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 The time path (λ(t), y(t)) and cost function C(L,H) have the following prop-
erties:
(i) The initial condition (λ(0), y(0)) satisfies λ(0) = 0. The path always stays below
the straight line y = Φ
b
− λ and above the straight line y = Φ− λ, i.e., Φ− λ(t) <
y(t) < Φ
b
− λ(t) for all t ≥ 0; (see Figure 1)
(ii) The path (λ(t), y(t)) moves southeast, converges to (Φ, 0) and also approaches (but
never reaches) the line y = Φ− λ, i.e., dλ
dt
> 0, dy
dt
< 0, limt→∞(λ(t), y(t)) = (Φ, 0)
and dλ
dt
+ dy
dt
< 0, for all t ≥ 0; (see Figure 1)
(iii) The continuation utilities L(t) and H(t) decline with low-income report, and the
path (L(t), H(t)) approaches (but never reaches) the 45-degree line, i.e., dL
dt
< 0,
dH
dt
< 0, limt→∞(L(t), H(t)) = (−∞,−∞) and
d( LH )
dt
< 0 for all t ≥ 0; (see Figure
2)
(iv) The cost function C(L,H) is strictly convex;
(v) For a fixed L, limH↓L C(L,H) =∞.
Part (iii) states that the time path (L(t), H(t)) moves toward (−∞,−∞) and ap-
proaches the 45-degree line, i.e., limt→∞
H(t)
L(t)
= 1 (see Figure 2). That L and H decrease
with low-income report is for incentive reasons. In order to prevent an agent who tran-
sits to high income from postponing the high-income report, the principal punishes late
reporters by reducing H with the duration of low-income report. Moveover, H declines
faster than L, so the distortion (8) in the continuation contract increases with the du-
ration of low-income report.
Part (v) states that for a given L(t), the distortion approaches infinity when H(t)
is sufficiently close to L(t). Suppose H(t) = L(t) + ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is a small number.
Note that the high-income agent’s consumption path is not distorted. For the low-
income agent, consider three possibilities for the consumption path: flat, increasing, or
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decreasing. When the path is flat, a high-income agent may underreport his income and
obtain utility of at least [u(cLt +wH −wL)− u(c
L
t )]dt+ L. Because [u(c
L
t +wH −wL)−
u(cLt )]dt+L ≈ [u(c
L
t +wH−wL)−u(c
L
t )]dt+H > H , the incentive constraint is violated.
When the path is increasing, cLt must be below c
H
t , which leads to a similar violation of
the incentive constraint. Hence when ǫ is sufficiently small, cLt must be above c
H
t and
must approach infinity. Put differently,
H(t) ≥ (rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)H(t+ dt),
L(t) = πdtH(t) + (1− πdt)
[
(rdt)uL(t) + (1− rdt)L(t+ dt)
]
,
imply that
H(t)− L(t) = (1− πdt)
[
(rdt)(b− 1)uL(t) + (1− rdt)(H(t+ dt)− L(t+ dt))
]
> (1− πdt)(rdt)(b− 1)uL(t),
which implies uL(t) > −ǫ
(1−πdt)(rdt)(1−b)
. When ǫ is sufficiently small, uL(t) needs to be
sufficiently close to 0, which requires a large consumption at t. The large consumption
at t needs to be offset by much lower levels of consumption in the future, so as to deliver
a given level of continuation utility L(t). Hence the consumption path is very distorted
when H is just slightly above L.
3 Model: Costly Auditing
Besides distorting the consumption path to provide incentives, now the principal can
deter cheating by auditing the agent’s report. Auditing reveals the agent’s true income
but costs γ units of consumption good. Since high income is an absorbing state, it is
easy to see that auditing is unnecessary forever if the agent reports wH just once in
the past. In each period, conditional on low-income report, the principal chooses to
audit according to a Poisson arrival rate p(t) ≥ 0. That is, over a period of length dt,
she audits with probability p(t)dt and she does not audit with probability 1 − p(t)dt.
Note that, since our model is in continuous time, p(t) is the (endogenous) arrival rate
of an audit, not the auditing probability itself. If p(t) = 0, no auditing arrives, while
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if p(t) = ∞, the auditing probability has an atom at t. We assume that if an agent
is audited and caught cheating, he needs to pay a finite penalty of ψ > 0 forever. We
model finite penalty, because if infinite penalty (ψ =∞) is allowed, then an arbitrarily
small auditing probability would deliver the full information constant consumption.
The principal pre-commits not only to the two sequences of consumption, as in the
previous section, but also to the sequence of arrival rates of audit. We can again represent
the principal’s cost minimization problem as a dynamic program with L and H as state
variables. We continue to exclude the discounted income from the cost function C(L,H)
for the same reason as in the case without auditing; however, C(L,H) now includes both
the cost of delivering consumption and the cost of auditing.
Remark 3 When the principal audits and observes the true income, it is feasible for her
to deliver any continuation utility pair (L,H), (L < 0, H < 0). But when she delivers
less utility to a high-income agent than to a low-income agent (i.e., H < L < 0), it
induces the high-income agent to quit his high-income job and become a low-income
agent. Hence, we exclude the region {(L,H) : H < L < 0} from the domain of the cost
function. This is equivalent to assuming that a high-income agent can secretly become a
low-income agent whenever he wants to. Therefore, the domain of the cost function is
{(L,H) : L ≤ H < 0}.
Remark 4 The utility L = H < 0 can be delivered because the true income is observable
with an auditing technology.
The timing is as follows. In the initial period, the agent receives an income, either
wH or wL. He chooses to report either wH or wL to the principal. Then conditional
on the report, the principal chooses the auditing probability. Conditional on the report
and the outcome of the audit, the principal assigns current and future consumptions.
(Recall that auditing probability is zero if the report is wH .) In subsequent periods, if
an agent had reported wH in the past, he is in an absorbing state and no further reports
or auditing are necessary. If an agent had reported wL in every period in the past, then
he receives an income, either wH or wL. The sequence of events then is the same as in
the initial period.
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For now we impose a restriction that atomic auditing is not allowed. In subsection 3.3,
we verify that the principal will not use atomic auditing even if it is allowed. When there
is no atomic auditing (i.e., p(t) <∞), the promise-keeping and incentive constraints are
L(t) = πdtH(t) + (1− πdt)
(
p(t)dtL˜(t) + (1− p(t)dt)
[
(rdt)uL(t) + (1− rdt)L(t+ dt)
])
,
H(t) ≥ p(t)dteρψH(t) + (1− p(t)dt)
[
(rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)H(t+ dt)
]
,
where eρψH(t) is the agent’s continuation utility if he is audited and found to be a liar,
and L˜(t) denotes the low-income agent’s continuation utility if he is audited and found
to be a truth-teller. Thus, the differential equations for the state variables are
dL
dt
= (r + π)L− πH − ruL − p(L˜− L),(18)
dH
dt
= rH − rbuL − p(eρψ − 1)H − µ,(19)
where µ is, again, a slack variable. Note that if p is exogenously set to zero, then the
above differential equations are identical to (4) and (5) in Section 2.
We can write the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation satisfied by the cost
function C(L,H) as:
(r + π)C(L,H) = min
uL,p,L˜,H˜,µ
rc(uL) + πc(H) + p
(
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)
)
(20)
+CL(L,H)
(
(r + π)L− πH − ruL − p(L˜− L)
)
+CH(L,H)
(
rH − rbuL − p(eρψ − 1)H − µ
)
.
In the HJB equation, H˜ denotes the continuation utility to a low-income agent who
transited to high income immediately after he was audited.
The presence of the control variable p in the HJB equation (20) makes it difficult
to study the optimal contract directly. To simplify the analysis, in subsection 3.1, we
first study a restricted problem where the principal is able to audit only when L = H
(i.e., p(t) = 0 if L(t) < H(t)). We show the properties of the cost function under this
restriction. Then in subsection 3.2, we show that the principal would, in fact, not audit
when L < H , even if she is allowed to do so. In subsection 3.3, we show that the principal
would not use atomic auditing. Finally, in subsection 3.4, we study implications of the
optimal contract.
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3.1 A Restricted Problem
When L < H and p = 0, the HJB equation (20) reduces to
(r + π)C(L,H) = min
uL,µ
rc(uL) + πc(H) + CL(L,H)
(
(r + π)L− πH − ruL
)
(21)
+CH(L,H)
(
rH − rbuL − µ
)
.
When L = H and auditing is allowed, the HJB equation (20) applies. Recall that the
domain of the cost function in the unrestricted problem is L ≤ H < 0 (see Remark 3).
In the restricted problem, the domain remains the same. However, the feasible values of
p are restricted in parts of the domain: when L < H , the feasible set for p is a singleton
{0} and when L = H , the feasible set is [0,∞).
The restricted problem and the problem in Section 2 (where auditing is completely
shut down and the domain of the cost function is L < H < 0) share a lot of similarities.
When L < H , Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 continue to hold, i.e., the cost function is
homogeneous, µ ≡ 0 in equation (19) and the ODE system in (16) and (17) characterize
the dynamics.
But there are two important differences between the restricted problem and the
problem in Section 2. The first difference is that when L = H , C(L,H) is defined and
finite in the restricted problem, but it is not defined in Section 2 (or, the cost is infinity,
see part (v) in Lemma 3). The second difference is that the time path of (L(t), H(t))
in the restricted problem reaches the 45-degree line in finite time (see Figure 3), but it
does not reach the 45-degree line in Section 2 (see Figure 2).
To see the first difference, note that on the 45-degree line, perfectly smooth con-
sumption can be achieved as long as the arrival rate p of auditing is sufficiently large.
For example, when L = H , set uL = L = H , L˜ = H˜ = L, µ = 0 and p = r(1−b)
eρψ−1
. Then,
equations (18) and (19) imply that
dL
dt
= (r + π)L− πH − ruL − p(L˜− L) = 0,
dH
dt
= rH − rbuL − p(eρψ − 1)H − µ = 0.
Thus, both L and H are constant and the cost of implementing (L,H) cannot be infinite
when L = H , if auditing is allowed.
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45-degree line
t = N
(0, 0)
Figure 3: Time path of (L(t), H(t)) in the restricted problem.
To see the second difference, suppose to the contrary that the dynamic path of
(L(t), H(t)) never reaches the 45-degree line. Then in the region {(L,H) : L < H <
0}, the restricted problem is no different from the problem in Section 2 and, hence,
limH↓L C(L,H) = ∞, as in part (v) in Lemma 3. But this contradicts the property in
Lemma 1 that C(L,H) is decreasing in H and C(L,L) is finite.
Despite the two differences, we can characterize the dynamics in the restricted prob-
lem using the results from subsection 2.3. To begin, since the path of (L(t), H(t)) in the
restricted problem reaches the 45-degree line in finite time (Figure 3), let N denote the
first time that the path reaches the 45-degree line, i.e., L(t) = H(t) for the first time
at t = N . Similar to subsection 2.3 we can describe the path of (L(t), H(t)) in terms
of (λ(t), y(t)). Equations (16) and (17) completely describe the dynamic path before N
in the restricted problem. At N , H(N) = L(N), so using the prices in subsection 2.2
equation (7) implies that
ΦH(N)− λH(N) = ΦL(N) − λH(N) = −
1
ρ
.
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Thus y(N) = −1
ρH(N)
= Φ−λ and the path of (λ(t), y(t)) reaches the straight line y = Φ−λ
at time N . Lemma 4 below demonstrates that the auditing probability is positive at
t = N (when L(t) = H(t) for the first time). The evolution of L and H is then pinned
down by (18) and (19).
Lemma 4 When t = N , p > 0.
3.2 Optimal Auditing
The remaining issue is the auditing probability before N . In the restricted problem,
we forced the auditing probability to be zero for t < N (when L < H). In this subsection,
we show that the constraint p = 0 when L < H is not binding, i.e., the principal would
choose p = 0 even if the feasibility set for p is [0,∞).
Lemma 5 Let t < N . Suppose p ∈ [0,∞). Then the principal chooses p = 0.
When t < N , the path of (L(t), H(t)) is above the 45-degree line and the principal
does not audit. That is, in the pre-commitment contract, the principal guarantees that
she would not audit until N , despite the fact that income is private information.
Our main result is that the auditing pattern is periodic. The optimal mechanism
consists of cycles. A low-income agent begins each cycle with (L,H), L < H , and is
initially not audited. When the duration of his low-income reports reaches N , he will
be audited randomly according to an endogenous arrival rate p > 0. The actual instant
of audit depends on the realization of the audit random variable, so the actual audit
could be at any t ≥ N . The new cycle starts the moment after he is audited. In the
new cycle, the low-income agent begins with updated continuation utilities (L˜, H˜). Note
that while auditing is stochastic, N is deterministic and is completely pinned down by
the differential equations below:
dL
dt
= (r + π)L− πH − ruL,
dH
dt
= rH − rbuL.
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(These equations follow directly from (18) and (19), since p = 0 and µ = 0 when L < H .)
Starting from (L,H), N is the time taken to reach the 45-degree line along the path
implied by these equations.
The threshold duration N depends on primitives of the model, but does not de-
pend on the initial promised utility L0. The homogeneity property implies that, if
{(L(t), H(t)); t ≥ 0} is the optimal time path when the initial promise is L0, then
{( L¯0
L0
L(t), L¯0
L0
H(t)); t ≥ 0} is the optimal path when the initial promise is L¯0 6= L0. The
two paths reach the 45-degree line at the same time.
Proposition 1 When t ≥ N and conditional on low-income report, the principal audits
with an arrival rate p > 0. The time path (L(t), H(t)) stays on the 45-degree line and
moves along it toward (−∞,−∞) until the agent is randomly drawn to be audited. After
the audit, (L,H) jumps to a new state (L˜, H˜). Then the optimal contract enters a new
cycle.
In the unrestricted problem, there are two instruments to provide incentives for
truthfully reporting the transition to high income. The first instrument is dynamic
taxation that distorts the consumption path. The principal always uses this instrument.
The second instrument of auditing, however, is not used by the principal if L < H .
Since H
L
measures the distortion in the continuation contract (see the discussion after
Lemma 1), the closer H
L
is to 1, the higher is the distortion. Proposition 1 shows that
the principal uses the auditing instrument only when the distortion is the highest, i.e.,
when L = H .
The reason that the principal uses the two instruments asymmetrically is because
the marginal cost of the first instrument is increasing with the distortion, while that
of the second is constant. Starting with the full insurance consumption path, a first-
order distortion in consumption generates only a second-order welfare loss. Thus when
consumption distortion is small, it is nearly costless to use the first instrument and the
principal will avoid the second instrument. The principal uses the second instrument
of auditing only when the benefit of correcting the distortion is larger than the cost,
namely when (L,H) reaches the 45-degree line.
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The principal audits periodically, no matter how high the auditing cost γ is. This
is because the distortion in consumption converges to infinity and the benefit of using
the auditing instrument will eventually surpass any finite cost. This result contrasts
with that in Wang (2005), where the principal does not audit when γ is large, since the
income is i.i.d. in his environment and the distortion is constant. It also contrasts with
Monnet and Quintin (2005), where auditing is not used eventually, since the agent is
risk neutral.
3.3 No Atomic Auditing
In the previous two subsections, we have shown that the principal would set p = 0
when L < H and would set p > 0 but finite when L = H . In this subsection we will
show that the principal would never set p =∞, i.e., she will never use atomic auditing.
For the moment, denote P as the size of the atom if there is an atom in the auditing
probability when the state is (L,H). With probability P > 0 the principal audits and
with probability 1 − P she does not. Thus, the cost minimization problem for the
principal is
M(P ) = min
L˜,H˜,L¯,H¯
P
(
C(L˜, H˜) + γ
)
+ (1− P )C
(
L¯, H¯
)
(22)
s.t. L = PL˜+ (1− P )L¯,(23)
H ≥ PeρψH + (1− P )H¯,(24)
where (L˜, H˜) denotes the state if the agent is audited and (L¯, H¯) denotes the state if the
agent is not audited. Note that M(0) = C(L,H). Lemma 6 below states that atomic
auditing is not optimal.
Lemma 6 At any (L,H), L ≤ H, there is no atomic auditing, i.e., M(P ) > M(0) for
all P > 0.
3.4 Implications of the Optimal Contract
1. Reducing the cost of auditing (smaller γ) increases the auditing frequency.
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A smaller γ makes the auditing instrument cheaper than the dynamic taxation instru-
ment. As a result, the principal is willing to audit more frequently.
2. Increasing the variance of income (i.e., larger wH − wL) increases the auditing
frequency.
With a larger wH −wL, a high-income agent benefits more from underreporting income.
In the absence of auditing, the low-income agent’s consumption path needs to be dis-
torted more to provide dynamic incentives for truth telling. As a result, the auditing
instrument is used more frequently to reduce the distortion.
For instance, the rich might have more volatile income relative to the poor since capital
income might be a larger component of the income for the rich. Our model implies that
the rich would be audited more frequently, which is roughly consistent with the IRS
practice.
3. Agents with an intermediate level of risk aversion, ρ, are audited more frequently
relative to agents with either low or high risk aversion.
When ρ is small, distortion in the consumption path incurs little welfare loss, thus there
is no need to use auditing to reduce the distortion.
When ρ is large, a small distortion in consumption is able to generate large incentive
effects. Again, there is no need to audit. More specifically, let L0 = −1 and consider a no-
auditing contract in which consumptions decline linearly, i.e., cH(t) = cL(t) =
log( pi
r+pi
)−rt
ρ
.
This contract delivers the promised utility L0 because
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πH(t) + ruL(t)
)
dt = −
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
(π + r)ert
π
r + π
)
dt = −1.
It is I.C. because
dH(t)
dt
= rH(t) < rH(t)− rbuL(t).
When ρ→∞, the cost of the contract converges to the full information cost c(L0), which
is zero. The optimal no-auditing contract has very little distortion in consumption, and
there is no need to correct it frequently by auditing.
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4 Conclusion
We have studied a repeated hidden income environment with persistent incomes. A
principal, with imperfect ability to audit, designs an optimal taxation scheme as well
as an optimal auditing scheme. When the agent’s absolute risk aversion is constant, we
have shown that it is optimal to audit the low-income agent periodically. The optimal
mechanism consists of cycles. Within each cycle, an agent reporting low income is
guaranteed that he will not be audited until the duration of the low-income reports
exceeds a threshold. After the threshold is reached, the agent is audited randomly.
Unlike repeated hidden income model with i.i.d. incomes, the distortion in the con-
sumption path increases with the duration of low-income reports in our model. Auditing
helps the principal detect who is the truth-teller and who is the cheater. She can thus
correct the distortion in the consumption path after an audit. The benefit of auditing
increases with the duration of low-income reports whereas the cost of auditing is con-
stant. Consequently, the principal would use the auditing instrument no matter how
high the auditing cost is.
Our model is limited in several respects. First, our results are valid for the case of
CARA utility. With more general utility specifications, the length of each auditing cycle
would not be constant. However, we expect the periodic feature to remain.
Second, the binary nature of income levels – income is either wH or wL – is restrictive.
One implication of this assumption is that auditing occurs only at the lowest income
level (i.e., wL). When there are more than two income levels, the principal might audit
any income level below the maximum. If the only binding incentive constraint when the
report is wi is for the agent at the next higher income level wi+1, then our measure of
distortion remains useful in the more general setup, namely, the distortion is the ratio
between the continuation utility for the agent who just transited to wi+1 and that for
the agent who remains at wi. We conjecture that the auditing in the optimal contract
would still contain cycles.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) Equation (6) holds because
{(
cL∗(t), cH∗(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal contract to
implement (L,H) if and only if
{(
− log(α)
ρ
+ cL∗(t),− log(α)
ρ
+ cH∗(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the
optimal contract to implement (αL, αH). Differentiating (6) with respect to α and
then setting α = 1 yield (7).
(ii) We show CH ≤ 0 first. It is equivalent to show that C(L¯, H¯) ≤ C(L,H) for any
(L,H) and (L¯, H¯) with L = L¯, H < H¯ . The evolution of (L¯, H¯) is
dL¯(t)
dt
= (r + π)L¯(t)− πH¯(t)− ru¯L(t),
dH¯(t)
dt
= rH¯(t)− rbu¯L(t)− µ¯(t).
By picking µ¯(0) = ∞, H¯(t) could jump to H(t) immediately after time 0. Thus
C(L¯, H¯) ≤ C(L,H). It follows from (7) and CH ≤ 0 that
CL =
−1
ρ
− CHH
L
> 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: That λ(0) = 0 is because the principal chooses H(0) to
minimize the cost C(L(0), H(0)).3 To prove the second statement by contradiction,
suppose for some t∗ > 0, λ(t∗) = 0. Since λ(t) is non-negative, it achieves a minimum
at t∗, and the first- and second-order conditions are
dλ(t∗)
dt
= 0,(25)
d2λ(t∗)
dt2
≥ 0.(26)
Equations (11) and (25) imply that c′(H(t∗)) = Φ. The first-order condition (9) implies
that c′(uL(t∗)) = Φ, hence uL(t∗) = H(t∗). Therefore equation (5) and b ∈ (0, 1) imply
that dH(t
∗)
dt
≤ rH(t∗)− rbuL(t∗) < 0. Thus differentiating (11) with respect to t yields
d2λ(t∗)
dt2
= π
(
dλ(t∗)
dt
+ c′′(H(t∗))
dH(t∗)
dt
)
< 0,
which contradicts (26). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
3By contradiction, suppose λ(0) > 0, then the principal can further lower the cost by
increasing H(0). Increasing H(0) does not violate any incentive constraints and the principal
has complete freedom in picking H(0).
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(i) We proved λ(0) = 0 in Lemma 2. To show that y(t) < Φ
b
− λ(t) for all t, suppose
to the contrary that y(t∗) ≥ Φ
b
− λ(t∗) for some t∗. Then the phase diagram in
Figure 1 shows that the path will remain above the line y = Φ
b
−λ forever, because
dy(t)
dt
> 0 and dλ(t)
dt
> 0 for t > t∗. Eventually y and λ become unbounded, which
contradicts the fact that λ ∈ [0,Φ/b].
To show that y(t) > Φ−λ(t) for all t, suppose to the contrary that y(t∗) ≤ Φ−λ(t∗)
for some t∗. Then the phase diagram in Figure 1 shows that the path will remain
below the line y = Φ − λ afterwards, because dy(t)
dt
< 0 and dλ(t)
dt
< 0 for t > t∗.
Eventually y becomes negative. This contradicts the fact that y is positive.
(ii) Part (i) states that Φ − λ(t) < y(t) < Φ
b
− λ(t). It then follows from equations
(16) and (17) that dλ
dt
> 0 and dy
dt
< 0. To show that limt→∞(λ(t), y(t)) = (Φ, 0),
note that if a path between the two straight lines does not converge to (Φ, 0),
then it will eventually hit either one of the straight lines, or the horizontal axis
y = 0. Hitting a straight line contradicts part (i) and hitting the horizontal axis
contradicts that y > 0.
To prove dλ
dt
+ dy
dt
< 0, suppose to the contrary that d(λ+y)(t
∗)
dt
≥ 0 for some t∗. We
argue that d(λ+y)(t)
dt
≥ 0 for all t ≥ t∗. By contradiction, suppose t∗∗ ≡ infs{s >
t∗ : d(λ+y)(s)
dt
< 0} exists. It is easily seen that d(λ+y)(t
∗∗)
dt
= 0 and d
2(λ+y)(t∗∗)
dt2
≤ 0.
Adding equations (16) and (17) yields d(λ+y)
dt
= ry
2
Φ/b−λ
− ry+ π(λ+ y−Φ). It then
follows from dλ(t
∗∗)
dt
= −dy(t
∗∗)
dt
that
d2(λ+ y)(t∗∗)
dt2
=
(
2ry(Φ/b− λ)− ry2
(Φ/b− λ)2
− r
)
dy(t∗∗)
dt
= −r
(Φ/b− λ− y)2
(Φ/b− λ)2
dy(t∗∗)
dt
> 0,
which contradicts that d
2(λ+y)(t∗∗)
dt2
≤ 0. Since d(λ+y)(t)
dt
≥ 0 for all t ≥ t∗, equation
(16) and (λ+ y) > Φ imply that λ(t) grows unboundedly after t∗, and contradicts
the fact that λ(t) is bounded.
(iii) That dH
dt
< 0 and limt→∞H(t) = −∞ follow from that
dy
dt
< 0 and limt→∞ y(t) = 0,
because y ≡ −1
ρH
. To see that dL
dt
< 0, recall equation (7),
ΦL = Hλ− 1/ρ.
Since λ ≥ 0 is increasing and H < 0 is decreasing, Hλ and L both decrease with
time. It follows from L(t) < H(t) and limt→∞H(t) = −∞ that limt→∞ L(t) =
−∞. Dividing both sides of equation (7) by ΦH yields L
H
= (λ + y)/Φ. Thus it
follows from part (ii) that d
(
L(t)
H(t)
)
/dt < 0 and limt→∞
L(t)
H(t)
= 1.
(iv) Differentiating equation (7) with respect toH yields CLHL+CHHH = −CH , which
is
CLH = −CHH
H
L
−
CH
L
.(27)
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Substituting equation (27) into
dCH
dt
= CLH
dL
dt
+ CHH
dH
dt
,
we get
CHH
(
dH/dt
dL/dt
−
H
L
)
=
dCH/dt
dL/dt
+
CH
L
.
Then CHH > 0 follows from dCH/dt = d(−λ)/dt < 0, dL/dt < 0, CH ≤ 0, L < 0,
and dH/dt
dL/dt
− H
L
> 0.
Equation (27) and CHH > 0 imply that CLH < 0, which, together with equation
CLL
dL
dt
+ CLH
dH
dt
= dCL
dt
= 0, imply that CLL > 0. To finish the proof, note that
CLH
dL
dt
+ CHH
dH
dt
=
dCH
dt
< 0,
CLL
dL
dt
+ CLH
dH
dt
=
dCL
dt
= 0,
imply that
∣∣∣∣CLH dLdt
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣CHH dHdt
∣∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣∣CLH dHdt
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣CLLdLdt
∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore, C2LH < CLLCHH .
(v) For a fixed L, we first show that limǫ↓0CL(L,L + ǫ) = ∞. Consider a path
(L(t), H(t)) with L(0) = L andH(0) chosen optimally so that CH(L(0), H(0)) = 0.
Homogeneity (6) implies that
CL
(
L,
H(t)
L(t)
L
)
=
L(t)
L
CL(L(t), H(t)) =
L(t)
L
CL(L(0), H(0)).
Since limt→∞ L(t) = −∞, it follows that limt→∞CL
(
L, H(t)
L(t)
L
)
= ∞. Since
limt→∞
H(t)
L(t)
= 1, we have
lim
ǫ↓0
CL(L,L+ ǫ) = lim
t→∞
CL
(
L,
H(t)
L(t)
L
)
=∞.
Second we show limH↓L C(L,H) =∞. Consider a path (L(t), H(t)) with L(0) = L
and H(0) = L+ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is a small number. Equation (9) implies c′(uL(t)) =
Φ− bλ ≥ (1− b)Φ = (1− b)CL(L(0), L(0) + ǫ). If ǫ is sufficiently small, u
L(t) and
cLt become sufficiently large, which implies that limH↓L C(L,H) =∞.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: To show that p > 0 at t = N , suppose to the contrary that
p = 0, then equations (18) and (19) imply
dH
dt
= rH − rbuL < r(L− uL) =
dL
dt
,
which contradicts that H(t) ≥ L(t), for all t ≥ N . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: To prove that p = 0 is optimal when L < H , it is sufficient
to show the first-order condition
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)− CL(L,H)(L˜− L)− CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H > 0, when L < H.
Firstly, we show that when L = H ,
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)− CL(L,H)(L˜− L)− CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H = 0.(28)
By contradiction, suppose C(L˜, H˜)+ γ−C(L,H)−CL(L,H)(L˜−L)−CH(L,H)(e
ρψ−
1)H 6= 0. If
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)− CL(L,H)(L˜− L)− CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H < 0,
then picking a large enough p > 0 makes the right side of the HJB (20) less than the
left side, which is a contradiction. If
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)− CL(L,H)(L˜− L)− CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H > 0,
then since p > 0 when L = H ,
(r + π)C(L,H) = min
uL,p,L˜,H˜
rc(uL) + πc(H) + p(C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H))
+CL(L,H)
(
(r + π)L− πH − ruL − p(L˜− L)
)
+CH(L,H)
(
rH − rbuL − p(eρψ − 1)H
)
> min
uL
rc(uL) + πc(H) + CL(L,H)
(
r(L− uL)− π(H − L)
)
+CH(L,H)
(
rH − rbuL
)
.
By continuity, the above strict inequality at t = N continues to hold when t is sufficiently
close to N , which violates the HJB equation (21) when L < H .
Secondly, we show that,
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)− CL(L,H)(L˜− L)− CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H > 0, when L < H.
The first-order conditions for (L˜, H˜) in (20) are
CL(L˜, H˜) = CL(L,H),
CH(L˜, H˜) = 0.
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Because CL(L,H) remains constant when t < N , these first-order conditions imply that
L˜ = L(0) and H˜ = H(0). Since L˜ and H˜ are constants for all t < N , the derivative of
(C(L˜, H˜) + γ −C(L,H))−CL(L,H)(L˜−L)−CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H with respect to t is
−CL(L,H)
dL
dt
− CH(L,H)
dH
dt
+ CL(L,H)
dL
dt
−CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)
dH
dt
−
dCH(L,H)
dt
(eρψ − 1)H
= −CH(L,H)e
ρψ dH
dt
−
dCH(L,H)
dt
(eρψ − 1)H < 0,
where the inequality follows from dH
dt
< 0, −dCH (L,H)
dt
= dλ
dt
> 0 and H < 0, as shown
in parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 3. Because (C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H))− CL(L,H)(L˜ −
L)− CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H decreases over time and it reaches zero at time N , as shown
in (28), (C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)) − CL(L,H)(L˜ − L) − CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H must be
positive when t < N . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The time path (L(t), H(t)) stays on the 45-degree
when t ≥ N because all the states above the 45-degree line will eventually converge to
it, as can be seen in Figure 3. To see that the state is not constant after it reaches the
45-degree line, we show that dL
dt
= dH
dt
< 0. Since L = H = − 1
ρy
and uL = − 1
ρ(Φ−bλ)
,
equation (18) is
dL
dt
= (r + π)L− πH − ruL − p(L˜− L)
= r(L− uL)− p(L˜− L)
= r
(
1
ρ(Φ− bλ)
−
1
ρy
)
− p(L˜− L).
Because y = Φ − λ on the 45-degree line, 1
ρ(Φ−bλ)
< 1
ρy
. It follows from the first-order
conditions for (L˜, H˜) that
L˜ =
−1/ρ
CL(L˜, H˜)
≥
−1/ρ− CH(L,H)H
CL(L˜, H˜)
=
−1/ρ− CH(L,H)H
CL(L,H)
= L.
Hence,
dL
dt
= r
(
1
ρ(Φ− bλ)
−
1
ρy
)
− p(L˜− L) < 0.
The auditing arrival rate p can be solved by dL
dt
= dH
dt
. Equations (18), (19), and
L = H yield
(r + π)L− πH − ruL − p(L˜− L) = rH − rbuL − p(eρψ − 1)H,
and
p =
r(b− 1)uL
L˜− eρψL
> 0.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: First, we show that the objective M(P ) in (22) is a strictly
convex function of P . Denote the optimal solution by L˜(P ), H˜(P ), L¯(P ), and H¯(P ).
Suppose θ ∈ (0, 1) and P = θP1+ (1− θ)P2, P1 6= P2. Then construct a solution for the
problem M(P ) as follows,
(L˜, H˜) =
θP1
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
(
L˜(P1), H˜(P1)
)
+
(1− θ)P2
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
(
L˜(P2), H˜(P2)
)
,
(L¯, H¯) =
θ(1− P1)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
(
L¯(P1), H¯(P1)
)
+
(1− θ)(1− P2)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
(
L¯(P2), H¯(P2)
)
.
Using the same proof as that in part (iv) in Lemma 3, we can prove that the cost
function C(L,H) is strictly convex. Therefore,
M(P )
≥ P
(
C(L˜, H˜) + γ
)
+ (1− P )C(L¯, H¯)
> P
(
θP1
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
C
(
L˜(P1), H˜(P1)
)
+
(1− θ)P2
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
C
(
L˜(P2), H˜(P2)
))
+ Pγ
+(1− P )
( θ(1− P1)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
C(L¯(P1), H¯(P1))
+
(1− θ)(1− P2)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
C(L¯(P2), H¯(P2))
)
= θ
(
P1
(
C
(
L˜(P1), H˜(P1)
)
+ γ
)
+ (1− P1)C(L¯(P1), H¯(P1))
)
+(1− θ)
(
P2
(
C
(
L˜(P2), H˜(P2)
)
+ γ
)
+ (1− P2)C(L¯(P2), H¯(P2))
)
= θM(P1) + (1− θ)M(P2).
Second, we show that, for all P > 0, M(P ) > C(L,H) = M(0). Because M(P ) is
strictly convex, it is sufficient to prove that M ′(0) ≥ 0. To finish the proof, we will show
that
M ′(0) =
(
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)
)
−
(
CL(L,H)(L˜− L) + CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H
)
.
Denote the Lagrangian multipliers on constraints (23) and (24) by ξL(P ) and ξH(P ),
respectively. Then
M ′(P ) =
(
C(L˜(P ), H˜(P )) + γ − C(L¯(P ), H¯(P ))
)
−
(
ξL(P )(L˜(P )− L¯(P )) + ξH(P )(e
ρψH − H¯(P ))
)
,
ξL(P ) = CL
(
L˜(P ), H˜(P )
)
= CL
(
L¯(P ), H¯(P )
)
,
ξH(P ) = CH(L¯(P ), H¯(P )).
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Since limP→0 L¯(P ) = L, limP→0 H¯(P ) = H , we have
lim
P↓0
M ′(P ) =
(
C(L˜, H˜) + γ − C(L,H)
)
−
(
CL(L,H)(L˜− L) + CH(L,H)(e
ρψ − 1)H
)
≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
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